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EDUCATION UNDER FIRE?: AN ANALYSIS
OF CAMPUS CARRY AND UNIVERSITY
AUTONOMY IN GEORGIA
Brooke Anne Carrington
In 2017, Georgia’s controversial campus carry bill
was signed into law despite protest from the state’s
Board of Regents, university officials, and students.
Georgia is one of ten states that has implemented
campus carry. Georgia’s campus carry statute is unique
in that it may conflict with Georgia’s Constitution,
which vests the powers of “government, control, and
management” of the University System of Georgia in the
Board of Regents. Georgia courts have not yet addressed
what this provision of the Constitution means. This Note
applies
general
principles
of
constitutional
interpretation to the provision.
This Note analyzes the framers’ intent when drafting
the provision in the 1940s and amending the provision
in the 1980s. The history surrounding this constitutional
provision is particularly informative because it was
adopted after Governor Eugene Talmadge attempted to
take over the university system in the 1940s. Some states
have developed a university autonomy jurisprudence,
which provides a preview of limits that a Georgia court
may impose on the Board of Regents’ powers. After
analyzing the effects of the campus carry statutory
scheme, this Note concludes that one portion of the
statutory scheme conflicts with Georgia’s Constitution,
meaning the Board of Regents can implement further
exceptions to campus carry.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 4, 2017, Governor Nathan Deal signed the highly
controversial campus carry bill into law, which mandates that
public Georgia universities allow license holders to carry concealed
handguns on college campuses.1 The General Assembly considered
similar legislation each year for five years prior.2 The governor
vetoed campus carry in 2016 after the Board of Regents (the Board),
the presidents of twenty-nine universities, and campus police chiefs
spoke out against the bill.3 When vetoing the legislation in 2016,
Governor Deal stated, “[f]rom the early days of our nation and state,
colleges have been treated as sanctuaries of learning where
firearms have not been allowed. To depart from such time-honored
protections should require overwhelming justification. I do not find
that such justification exists.”4
But, in 2017, state lawmakers again introduced campus carry
legislation.5 This time, the drafters incorporated a limited number
of exceptions.6 The governor then indicated that he would agree to
sign the bill because these exceptions adequately addressed his
previous concerns.7 Before Governor Deal officially signed the bill,
1 See Greg Bluestein, Georgia Governor Signs Campus Gun Measure, ATLANTA J. CONST.
(May 4, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/georgia-governorsigns-campus-gun-measure/f02kSvtstlOhpUhniiyxxO/ (“Gov. Nathan Deal signed a measure
Thursday that . . . would allow people with firearms permits to carry concealed guns onto
public college and university campuses . . . .”).
2 See Kristina Torres & Michelle Baruchman, Is This the Year Georgia Legalizes Guns on
College Campuses?, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://politics.myajc.com/news/state-regional-govt--politics/this-the-year-georgia-legalizes-guns-collegecampuses/djMbnT0Fc8uFiv1QyiJryK/ (mentioning that the legislation was considered for
five years).
3 Kristen Bailey, USG Chancellor Weighs in on Campus Carry Legislation, GA. TECH
NEWS CTR. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.news.gatech.edu/2016/03/03/usg-chancellor-weighscampus-carry-legislation (“[T]he Board of Regents, the presidents of its 29 institutions, its
campus police chiefs, and many others support the current firearm law for campuses.”).
4 Deal Issues 2016 Veto Statements, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR (May 3, 2016),
https://nathandeal.georgia.gov/press-releases/2016-05-03/deal-issues-2016-veto-statements.
He also stated that it was “highly questionable” whether campus carry would make campuses
safer and even suggested a sentencing enhancer for those carrying unauthorized weapons on
campus. Id.
5 See Torres & Baruchman, supra note 2 (reporting that campus carry made its way
through the legislature again in 2017).
6 See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(c)(20)(A) (2018) (outlining exceptions to allowing guns on
campus). The 2016 bill only included exceptions for student housing and sporting events. H.B.
859 § 1, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016).
7 STATE OF GA. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, HB 280 SIGNING STATEMENT (2017) (“I
appreciate the thoughtful consideration given by the General Assembly in expanding these
excluded areas within a college campus in this year’s bill.”).
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students, faculty, the Board, and other university officials again
spoke out against it.8 In addition, the majority of students and
Georgia citizens disagreed with allowing guns on college campuses.9
Nevertheless, Governor Deal signed the bill, and his change in
opinion from the previous year has been criticized as politically
motivated and disconnected from concerns about students and the
university system.10 Governor Deal rationalized his decision to sign
the bill by citing safety concerns for students that may be traveling
through dangerous areas off campus when commuting to and from
universities.11
Georgia is not the first state to enact campus carry legislation.12
Due to the frequency of mass shootings, debate has swirled around
whether to allow concealed carry on college campuses.13 Counting
Georgia, ten states have passed legislation allowing concealed

8 Johnny Kauffman, Ga. University System Head Opposes New ‘Campus Carry’ Bill,
WABE (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.wabe.org/ga-university-system-head-opposes-newcampus-carry-bill/ (describing Chancellor Steve Wrigley’s statement that the Board, the
presidents of Georgia’s public universities, and campus police departments opposed the
campus carry bill).
9 See Rebecca Burns & Nate Harris, Campus Carry Has Georgia’s Pro-Gun Governor in
the Hot Seat Again, TRACE (May 2, 2017), https://www.thetrace.org/2017/05/georgia-campuscarry-nathan-deal-veto/ (stating that a poll of 4,300 students, staff, and faculty at the
University of Georgia showed that sixty-nine percent of respondents opposed the 2016 version
of campus carry); Maureen Downey, Georgia Tech Student Leaders: We Don’t Want Guns on
Our Campus, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.myajc.com/blog/getschooled/georgia-tech-student-leaders-don-want-guns-ourcampus/wynmdsPoXdChgFlF8Te7zJ/ (stating that 70 percent of 5,738 Georgia Tech students
surveyed opposed the 2016 bill); Kristina Torres, AJC Poll: Don’t Allow Guns on Georgia’s
College Campuses, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state-regional-govt--politics/ajc-poll-don-allow-guns-georgia-collegecampuses/1BoFZV6gB2RCA6lEdChU3L/ (stating that 54 percent of poll respondents did not
want the legislature to pursue campus carry again in 2017).
10 See, e.g., Ian Bogost, The Real Chaos of Campus Gun Laws, ATLANTIC (May 8, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/05/the-real-chaos-of-campus-gunlaws/525762/ (“HB 280 looks like a law enacted for political spoils rather [than] policy
effects.”); EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, COMPARING GOVERNOR DEAL’S 2016 VETO
STATEMENT TO HB 280, https://everytown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/4.8.17-GeorgiaVeto-Comparison-Factsheet-FINAL.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2019) (demonstrating that H.B.
280 did not address the majority of Governor Deal’s concerns about the 2016 bill).
11 See STATE OF GA. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 7 (reasoning that students are
targeted because criminals know that students are unarmed and that universities have failed
to adequately address this concern within the past year).
12 Guns on Campus: Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 14, 2018)
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/guns-on-campus-overview.aspx (referencing states
that allow campus carry).
13 See id. (reasoning that campus carry has become a hot issue because of mass shootings
on campuses).
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weapons on college campuses.14 Twenty-three states have left the
decision of whether to allow concealed carry to universities, and
sixteen states have passed legislation prohibiting concealed
weapons on college campuses altogether.15
Georgia’s campus carry law is unique in that it may conflict with
Georgia’s Constitution.16 Opponents of campus carry laws in other
states have focused on possible claims under the United States
Constitution.17 For example, professors in Texas filed a lawsuit
against state government officials claiming that campus carry
violated the First, Second, and Fourteenth Amendments, but their
lawsuit has failed thus far.18 In contrast, in 2017, several Georgia
professors filed suit against Governor Deal and the Georgia
Attorney General, alleging that Georgia’s campus carry statutes
conflict with a provision in the state Constitution that delegates the
government, management, and control of the university system to
the Board.19 The Superior Court of Fulton County dismissed the
professors’ complaint on sovereign immunity and standing grounds
without reaching the state constitutional issue.20
This Note proceeds in three subsequent parts. Part II will explain
Georgia’s campus carry statutes and the constitutional provision at
issue, discuss the history and political context surrounding the
Constitutions of 1945 and 1983, and review Georgia case law. Part
III of this Note argues that Georgia’s Constitution gives the Board
significant authority as an autonomous entity and that regulating
firearms should be within that authority. Finally, Part IV concludes

Id.
Id.
16 See, e.g., Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–4, Knox v. Deal,
No. 2017CV295763, 2017 WL 4354614 (Ga. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2017) (arguing that the
statute is unconstitutional).
17 See, e.g., Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2018) (dismissing plaintiffs’
academic freedom claim and other claims); Shaundra K. Lewis, Crossfire on Compulsory
Campus Carry Laws: When the First and Second Amendments Collide, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2109,
2141 (2017) (arguing that the First Amendment right to academic freedom prevails over the
Second Amendment); Laura Houser Oblinger, The Wild, Wild West of Higher Education:
Keeping the Campus Carry Decision in the University’s Holster, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 87, 106–11
(2013) (arguing that campus carry violates the right to academic freedom).
18 See Glass, 900 F.3d at 236 (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims).
19 See supra note 16.
20 See generally Knox v. Deal, No. 2017CV295763 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2018) (denying
injunction and dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint). The plaintiffs in this suit urged the court to
invalidate the entire campus carry statutory scheme, while this Note argues that one portion
is invalid.
14
15
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that Georgia’s Constitution permits the Board to create additional
exceptions to campus carry.
II. BACKGROUND
Georgia’s campus carry legislation has taken effect through a
combination of statutes.21 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 criminalizes
carrying guns into unauthorized locations, while O.C.G.A.
§ 16-11-127.1 establishes college campuses as an authorized
location. Additionally, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1 outlines exceptions
where weapons are not authorized on college campuses, including
student housing, athletic events, childcare centers, spaces used for
high school instruction, faculty and administrative offices, and
locations where disciplinary hearings are conducted.22 To carry a
handgun on a college campus, the carrier must have a license and
the handgun must be concealed.23 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-173 states that
“no . . . agency, board, . . . school district, or authority of this state,
other than the General Assembly . . . shall regulate in any
manner . . . [t]he
possession,
ownership,
transport,
[or]
carrying . . . of firearms or other weapons.” O.C.G.A. § 16-11-173
plays a central role in the campus carry scheme even though it was
part of the Georgia Code before. This statute was not problematic
until the passage of H.B. 280 because the Board and the General
Assembly had historically agreed that guns should be prohibited on
campuses.
On the other hand, Article VIII of the Georgia Constitution
states, “[t]he government, control, and management of the
University System of Georgia . . . shall be vested in the Board of
Regents of the University System of Georgia.”24 This language was
part of a statute originally enacted in 1931 and was then codified in
the Georgia Constitution in 1945.25 The language of the provision
was later altered in the current Constitution that took force in

21 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 (2018) (criminalizing unauthorized carry); O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1
(2018) (establishing universities as an exception where guns are permitted); O.C.G.A.
§ 16-11-173 (2018) (prohibiting, with limited exceptions, authorities other than the General
Assembly from regulating firearms).
22 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(c)(20)(A) (2018) (outlining the exceptions to campus carry).
23 Id. (requiring license and concealment).
24 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1(b).
25 O.C.G.A. § 20-3-51 (2018) (vesting the Board with government, control, and
management); GA. CONST. of 1945, art. VIII, § IV, para. 1 (showing the same language).
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1983.26 Only approximately fifteen states give public universities
autonomy under their Constitutions, with Michigan, California, and
Minnesota giving the strongest form of autonomy to universities.27
A. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE CONSTITUTION OF 1945

Codifying the Board’s powers into the Georgia Constitution came
in response to Governor Eugene Talmadge’s over-involvement in
the university system, which ultimately resulted in the
disaccreditation of Georgia’s public universities.28 In 1941,
Talmadge accused Walter D. Cocking, Dean of the College of
Education at the University of Georgia, and Marvin S. Pittman,
President of the Georgia State Teachers College at Statesboro, of
favoring racial integration, having communist views, and generally
offending “southern principles.”29 He attempted to manipulate the
Board into dismissing both administrators, but the Board members
disobeyed him.30 Talmadge then dismissed the Board members who
disagreed with him and packed the Board with his supporters.31
With control of the Board, Talmadge fired any faculty member that
he believed supported integration or communism, and he viewed
professors from outside of Georgia as particularly suspect.32 He also
threatened to purge books from university libraries that conveyed
messages with which he disagreed.33 His takeover culminated in a
26 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1 (demonstrating that certain language was deleted in
the 1983 Constitution).
27 Neal H. Hutchens, Preserving the Independence of Public Higher Education: An
Examination of State Constitutional Autonomy Provisions for Public Colleges and
Universities, 35 J.C. & U.L. 271, 282–307 (2009). The status of several states, including
Georgia, is uncertain because the constitutional provisions have not been clearly interpreted
by the courts. Id. at 302–07.
28 See PATRICK NOVOTNY, THIS GEORGIA RISING 95 (2007) (describing the withdrawal of
accreditation).
29 See id. at 46–47 (summarizing Talmadge’s accusations against the university
administrators).
30 See id. at 47, 54 (recounting how the Board initially dismissed Cocking and Pittman but
subsequently reconsidered and reversed).
31 See THOMAS G. DYER, THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY,
1785–1985, at 230–31 (1985) (describing the packing of the Board).
32 See id. at 231, 234–35 (discussing the firings of several professors and “the
ridiculousness” of requiring professors to be from Georgia when only three professors at the
University of Georgia School of Education were from Georgia); NOVOTNY, supra note 28, at
55–56 (discussing Talmadge’s stance on “foreign professors”).
33 See NOVOTNY, supra note 28, at 56–57, 70–71 (discussing how the state assistant
attorney general launched an investigation into “questionable” books on campus that
discussed relations between the races, and how Talmadge stated, “[w]e’re going to get rid of
them”).
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scandal when the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary
Schools (SACSS) decided to revoke accreditation from ten of
Georgia’s public universities.34
Unsurprisingly, the accreditation of Georgia’s universities
became a major talking point during the election of 1942.35 Ellis
Arnall, Talmadge’s main challenger during the primaries,
announced his candidacy a matter of days before SACSS announced
the withdrawal of accreditation.36 He focused his campaign on
restoring accreditation and insulating the Board from political
influence.37 Students across the state protested the disaccreditation
and endorsed Arnall for governor,38 and Arnall gave some of his
most notable campaign speeches at universities.39
After Arnall won the governorship in 1942, the General
Assembly unanimously passed a constitutional amendment giving
the Board significant autonomy, and the governor signed the
amendment.40 The public ratified it in 1943 by a large majority.41
Arnall stated that the purpose of the amendment was “to keep
politics out of the education system.”42 Shortly after the adoption of
the amendment, SACSS reinstated accreditation.43

34 Id. at 95–96 (“SACSS was ‘forced to conclude that the University System of Georgia had
been the victim of unprecedented and unjustifiable political inference’ . . . . [The firings]
‘flagrantly violated sound educational policy.’”).
35 See DYER, supra note 31, at 237 (stating that the university system was the dominant
issue of the 1942 elections).
36 See NOVOTNY, supra note 28, at 93–94 (describing the timing of Arnall’s announcement).
37 See DYER, supra note 31, at 237 (recounting how Arnall promised to “rectify past wrongs
and work for restoration of the system’s accreditation”); NOVOTNY, supra note 28, at 102 (“My
first official act as Governor of Georgia will be to inaugurate and set in motion a program
designed to free our state institutions from political influence, domination, and control.”
(citing ATLANTA J. CONST., May 17, 1942, at A12)).
38 See DYER, supra note 31, at 237 (“The campaign also saw large numbers of university
students actively working [on] Arnall’s behalf.”); NOVOTNY, supra note 28, at 108
(summarizing a protest in Statesboro).
39 NOVOTNY, supra note 28, at 107–10 (describing speeches in Statesboro and Athens).
40 DYER, supra note 31, at 238 (“Proposed as a constitutional amendment, the bills
received unanimous approval from both houses of the legislature. Arnall immediately signed
them into law and the people overwhelmingly ratified the action of governor and legislature
in the next general election.”).
41 Id.
42 NOVOTNY, supra note 28, at 119.
43 Id. at 122 (“The executive committee of . . . (SACSS) restored the university system’s
accreditation on 30 January 1943.”).
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Arnall then headed the commission to rewrite Georgia’s
Constitution in 1943,44 and the language of the provision remained
unchanged.45 In the Constitution of 1945, the provision stated,
There shall be a Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia, and the government, control, and
management of the University System of Georgia and
all of its institutions in said system shall be vested in
said Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia . . . . The said Board of Regents of the
University System of Georgia shall have the powers
and duties as provided by law existing at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution, together with such
further powers and duties as may be hereafter
provided by law.46
B. CONSTITUTION OF 1983

Because Georgia’s Constitution had become filled with an
unorganized assortment of amendments, legislators decided in 1977
to again rewrite the document.47 The language of the Board of
Regents provision stayed essentially the same, but the drafters
removed the language tying the Board’s powers to statute:48
(b) . . . The government, control, and management of
the University System of Georgia and all of the
institutions in said system shall be vested in the
Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia . . . .
(d) The board of regents may hold, purchase, lease,
sell, convey, or otherwise dispose of public property,

44 1 RECORDS OF THE COMMISSION OF 1943–1944 TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF
GEORGIA 4–5 (Albert B. Saye ed., 1946) (establishing Arnall as the chairman of the
commission by a unanimous vote).
45 GA. CONST. of 1945, art. VIII, § IV, para. 1.
46 Id.
47 See MELVIN B. HILL, JR., THE GEORGIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 16,
19 (1994) (describing the goals of the constitutional commission as making provisions flexible
and removing all provisions that should be statutory in nature).
48 Compare GA. CONST. of 1945, art. VIII, § IV, para. 1 (tying the Board’s powers to statutes
in 1945 and thereafter), with GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1(d) (only tying “other powers”
to statute).
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execute conveyances thereon, and utilize the proceeds
arising therefrom; may exercise the power of eminent
domain in the manner provided by law; and shall
have such other powers and duties as provided by
law.49
Committee Member Erwin A. Friedman stated that the language
was essentially as all-encompassing as he could imagine.50
Committee members expressed an interest in maintaining the
status quo of the university system and discussed at length the
special balance of power between the Board and the General
Assembly.51
C. GEORGIA CASE LAW

Georgia courts have not yet interpreted the specific language of
the provision other than to determine that the Board has sovereign
immunity because of its significant powers.52 However, prior to the
1983 Constitution, the Supreme Court of Georgia generally
described the Board’s powers as broad and wide-reaching.53 The
GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
See Committee to Revise Article VIII, 1 STATE OF GEORGIA SELECT COMMITTEE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 1977–1981 TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS 7 (June 10, 1980) (“[This
provision is] about as concise and as clear and all encompassing as I think [it] could be. You
know, it just says there shall be a Board of Regents and the government, control and
management of the university system and all of its institutions shall be vested in said Board
of Regents, period. I don’t think it could be any better than that, to be perfectly honest with
you.”). This Note cites to the bound volumes of these transcripts, which are organized by date.
The page numbers restart for each meeting date.
51 Id. at 12 (“The relationship between the Board of Regents and the legislature is a
dynamic relationship . . . . [T]he Board of course is very jealous of its constitutional
responsibility with respect to higher education . . . and the legislature which each one is
always very gracious about the other’s authority and power . . . .”); Committee to Revise Article
VIII, 1 STATE OF GEORGIA SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 1977–1981
TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS 6 (May 22, 1980) (“I was of the impression that the Board of
Regents has complete power and control, you know, over our University System.”).
52 See, e.g., Olvera v. Univ. Sys. of Ga.’s Bd. of Regents, 782 S.E.2d 436, 438 (Ga. 2016)
(reasoning that the Board has sovereign immunity because it “is the state agency vested with
the governance, control, and management of the University System of Georgia”).
53 See McCafferty v. Med. Coll. of Ga., 287 S.E.2d 171, 175–76 (Ga. 1982) (discussing the
legislative history behind the constitutional amendment of 1943 and concluding that the
Board should be able to sue to protect its powers); Villyard v. Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 50
S.E.2d 313, 317 (Ga. 1948) (ruling that the Board had the power to operate a laundry business
at reduced prices because it was a power necessary to its usefulness); State v. Regents of
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 175 S.E. 567, 572 (Ga. 1934) (“The powers granted are broad and
comprehensive, and, subject to the exercise of a wise and proper discretion, the regents are
untrammeled except by such restraints of law as are directly expressed, or necessarily
49
50
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Court of Appeals of Georgia recently cited the constitutional
provision in Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v.
Doe without interpreting what exactly the clause means.54 The court
confusingly cited cases prior to the 1983 revision and statutes that
were in place prior to the 1945 Constitution.55 However, the court
did not need to resolve whether the Board is limited by statute to
determine that the Board had the ability to delegate its powers to
one of its institutions.56 In addition, the Court of Appeals of Georgia
lacks the jurisdiction to determine constitutional questions.57 The
Supreme Court of Georgia has ruled that the Board and university
entities are subject to the Open Records Act and Open Meetings Act,
but the case never mentioned the constitutional provision.58
Without much guidance from Georgia courts on how to interpret
this provision of the Constitution, it is necessary to utilize Georgia’s
general approach to constitutional interpretation.
III. ANALYSIS
When determining if a statute conflicts with the Constitution,
the plain meaning of the text governs.59 Georgia courts also look to
the intent of the framers, which can be derived from constitutional

implied. The Legislature does not pretend to govern the system, but has intrusted this
responsibility to the Board of Regents.”).
54 630 S.E.2d 85, 91–92 (2006).
55 See id. (first citing Villyard, 50 S.E.2d at 315; and then citing O.C.G.A. § 20-3-31).
56 See id. at 92 (reasoning that the Board did not show the law limits it in delegating power
to Georgia Tech). But see Hutchens, supra note 27, at 306–07 (reasoning that Doe makes the
status of constitutional autonomy in Georgia ambiguous).
57 See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 2 (stating that the Supreme Court of Georgia has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction for constitutional questions).
58 See generally Red & Black Publ’g Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 427 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1993)
(holding that the University of Georgia’s student Organization Court was subject to these
statutes). One can safely assume that a constitutional argument was not presented to the
court because the provision was not mentioned in the opinion.
59 See, e.g., Olevik v. State, 806 S.E.2d 505, 513 (Ga. 2017) (“[W]e consider the plain and
ordinary meaning of the text, viewing it in the context in which it appears and reading the
text in its most natural and reasonable manner.”); Lathrop v. Deal, 801 S.E.2d 867, 882 (Ga.
2017) (reasoning that the plain and natural meaning governs because “[c]onstitutions are the
result of popular will” (first citing Clarke v. Johnson, 33 S.E.2d 425, 427 (Ga. 1945); and then
citing Ga. Motor Trucking Ass’n v. Ga. Dep’t of Revenue, 801 S.E.2d 9, 12 (Ga. 2017))).
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commissions,60 and the effects of the statute if held valid.61 Georgia
has a strong presumption of constitutionality,62 but if a statute and
the Constitution conflict, the statute is considered void.63
A. TEXT

The Supreme Court of Georgia has repeatedly ruled that the
plain meaning of the text always governs when interpreting
constitutional provisions.64 The plain meaning of this provision
supports allowing the Board the discretion to decide where guns
should be allowed on campus. According to Merriam-Webster, the
term “vested” means “fully and unconditionally guaranteed as a
legal right, benefit, or privilege.”65 “Government” means
“exercis[ing] continuous sovereign authority over” or “the making
and administration of policy in.”66 “Control” means “directing
influence over.”67 “Management” means “the conducting or
supervising of something.”68
After deriving the plain meaning of this provision by defining
each relevant term, it can be inferred that the Georgia Constitution
gives the Board the absolute legal right to make policies concerning
the university system. And notably, while the Constitution does not
60 See, e.g., Olevik, 806 S.E.2d at 513 (“[T]he broader context in which that text was
enacted may also be a critical consideration.”); Neal v. State, 722 S.E.2d 765, 771 (Ga. 2012)
(“The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the legislative intent, keeping in view the
old law, the evil, and the remedy.” (citing O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(a) (2018))); Serv. Emps. Int’l Union
v. Perdue, 628 S.E.2d 589, 591 (Ga. 2006) (reasoning that the intent of the framers is one of
multiple considerations); Smith v. McMichael, 45 S.E.2d 431, 435 (Ga. 1947) (reasoning that
the interpretation of a disputed provision by a constitutional commission could be used to
show the framers’ intent).
61 See, e.g., Cade v. State, 60 S.E.2d 763, 767 (Ga. 1950) (“[T]he courts may look at the
effects of such [a] statute, if held valid.”).
62 See, e.g., Perdue, 628 S.E.2d at 591 (“[W]e must presume that acts of the General
Assembly are constitutional, and never declare them void ‘except in a clear and urgent
case . . . .’” (quoting Brugman v. State, 339 S.E.2d 244, 251 (Ga. 1986))); City of Calhoun v. N.
Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 213 S.E.2d 596, 605 (Ga. 1975) (reasoning that statutes must
violate “express words of the Constitution” to be considered void).
63 GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 5 (“Legislative acts in violation of this Constitution or the
Constitution of the United States are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them.”); see also
Dennison MFG Co. v. Wright, 120 S.E. 120, 123 (Ga. 1923) (“[An unconstitutional statute] is
wholly void. In legal contemplation it is as inoperative as if it had never been passed.”).
64 See cases cited supra note 59.
65 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1391 (11th ed. 2003).
66 Id. at 541. Government is defined as “the act or process of governing.” Id. These
definitions are derived from the definition for “govern.” See id.
67 Id. at 272.
68 Id. at 754.
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contain any explicit limitation on the Board’s powers, the drafters
clearly did limit the Board of Education’s powers in the preceding
sections.69 In the current Constitution, the Board’s powers are no
longer linked to statute.70 Subparagraph (d) in the Board of Regents
provision now states that that the Board will have such “other”
powers as provided by law.71 The plain meaning of this phrase does
not limit those powers already given to the Board, such as the
government, control, and management of the university system.72
The Office of the Attorney General has also supported this
interpretation.73 Furthermore, this phrase is located in the section
discussing the Board’s powers as they relate to property and
eminent domain, indicating that “other” refers to powers of a similar
kind.74 Accordingly, the Constitution of 1983 gives the Board even
more power than the Constitution of 1945 because only “other
powers” are now linked to statute instead of the Board’s powers
overall.75
However, the words “government, control, and management” are
open textured terms.76 Reasonable minds could disagree as to what
the plain meaning of these terms include, such as whether they
include implementing policies concerning safety and carrying
firearms on campus. Courts will have a lot of leeway to interpret
this phrase. Also, Georgia courts maintain a presumption of
constitutionality and require that challenged statutes clearly

69 See GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. 1 (“[Regarding p]ublic education for the citizens prior
to the college or postsecondary level[,] . . . the General Assembly may by general law provide
for the establishment of education policies for such public education.”); Id. § 2, para. 1(b) (“The
State Board of Education shall have such powers and duties as provided by law.”).
70 Compare GA. CONST. of 1945, art. VIII, § IV, para. 1 (“The said Board of Regents of the
University System of Georgia shall have the powers and duties as provided by law existing
at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, together with such further powers and duties
as may be hereafter provided by law.”), with GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1(b) (“The
government, control, and management of the University System of Georgia and all of the
institutions in said system shall be vested in the Board of Regents . . . . The board of
regents . . . shall have such other powers and duties as provided by law.”).
71 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
72 See id. (outlining the powers granted to the Board).
73 Unofficial Op. Ga. Att’y Gen. U96-12 (1996) (advising that a resolution requiring the
Board to take all actions necessary to uphold a Corps of Cadets program was merely advisory
because “the General Assembly may not, through the passage of a Joint Resolution which has
the effect of law, infringe upon the Board of Regents’ constitutional authority to govern,
control, and manage the University System of Georgia”).
74 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1(d).
75 See sources cited supra note 70.
76 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1(b).
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conflict with the Constitution.77 Therefore, courts may also consider
the intent of the framers and the effects of the statute to determine
if the statute and Constitution actually conflict with each other.78
B. INTENT OF THE FRAMERS

The framers of both Constitutions intended to give the Board
complete autonomy to control matters that affect the quality of
education.79 Fear of overreach into the intimate workings of the
university system was the entire reason the General Assembly
proposed the constitutional amendment in the first place.80
Governor Talmadge attempted to impose his views regarding
segregation and communism onto university officials.81 Georgia
universities lost accreditation because the university system was so
susceptible to political influence.82 Faculty, students, and the
citizens of Georgia demonstrated concern about the decrease in the
quality of education at Georgia’s universities, which is why the
public overwhelmingly approved the constitutional amendment.83
Governor Arnall, the most important framer of the 1945
Constitution, stated that the constitutional amendment would
guard the university system from overreach both by the executive
and the legislative branches.84
In essence, the framers almost created a fourth branch of
government due to the amount of autonomy they granted to the
Board. Universities have been described as separate entities that
warrant more protection than a typical state agency because they
See cases cited supra note 62.
See cases cited supra notes 60–61.
79 See supra Part II; see also Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Mich. State Univ.,
594 N.W.2d 491, 497 (Mich. 1999) (reasoning that the legislature cannot enter the educational
sphere (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Mich. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 204 N.W.2d 218
(Mich. 1973))). But see Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. State, 419 N.W.2d 773, 780 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988) (reasoning that university autonomy should not be limited to a strictly educational
sphere if there is no express limitation).
80 See supra Section II.A.
81 See supra notes 29–33.
82 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
83 See DYER, supra note 31, at 239 (“Among the . . . most potent effects were the waves of
adverse publicity which created an image of the university and other Georgia colleges as
backwater institutions where academic freedom did not exist and where gallus-snapping
demagogues regularly and successfully interfered in academic affairs.”).
84 RECORDS OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 44, at 200 (“No matter who is in the
Legislature or no matter who is the Governor of Georgia, [the Board] will continue to function
until the people change it, immune to the caprices and whims of politics . . . . [W]e went as
far as we could.”); Id. at 4–5 (establishing Arnall as chairman).
77
78
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are not under the control of one sole branch of government.85 The
framers of the Constitution of 1945, including Governor Arnall,
repeatedly emphasized that incorporating the Board into the
Constitution would free it from political interference.86 There is no
better example of political interference than specifically overriding
what the Board reasonably believes is best for education and the
student body, especially when the students, faculty, and citizens of
Georgia generally agree.87
The framers of the Constitution of 1983 agreed that the provision
kept the Board free from political interference even though they
slightly altered the language and structure.88 The framers merely
aimed to draft a longer lasting document because the Constitution
contained a large number of amendments and so many
constitutional provisions were linked to statute.89 Considering this
goal, the framers of the Constitution of 1983 did not intend to strip
the Board of any powers it already possessed and only gave the
General Assembly the ability to allocate to the Board further powers
that are not in the Constitution.90 They gave the Board even more
power by no longer linking the powers of governance, control, and
management to statute whatsoever. The commission agreed to keep
the language from the 1945 Constitution because it was already
all-encompassing.91 The granting of lump sum appropriations to the
Board also reflects the intention of the 1983 Commission to extend
the powers of the Board as well as to protect it from the General
Assembly.92
85 See, e.g., DEBORAH K. MCKNIGHT, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTONOMY:
A
LEGAL
ANALYSIS
3
(2004),
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/umcnauto.pdf (“Constitutional autonomy is a
legal principle that makes a state university a separate department of government, not
merely an agency of the executive or legislative branch.”).
86 See NOVOTNY, supra note 28, at 119 (demonstrating the framers’ intent); see also DYER
supra note 31, at 237 (discussing Governor Arnall’s intent).
87 See sources cited supra note 9 (discussing that students and citizens opposed the bill).
88 See Committee to Revise Article VIII, supra note 50, at 6 (“[The Constitution] keeps
higher education out of politics to a great degree.”).
89 See HILL, JR., supra note 47, at 19 (discussing the motivations behind rewriting the
Constitution).
90 See Committee to Revise Article VIII, supra note 50, at 41–42 (discussing that the powers
of government, control, and management should be permanent powers in the Constitution
but other powers could create a constitutional problem under the 1945 version).
91 See id.
92 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1(c) (stating that the Board will receive lump sum
appropriations instead of line item); Committee to Revise Article VIII, 2 STATE OF GEORGIA
SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 1977–1981 TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS 62
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The drafters of the 1983 Constitution discussed the unique
relationship between the Board and the General Assembly.93 A
legislator argued that the Board was almost its own branch of
government because the Board and the legislature exercised checks
and balances on each other. Committee Member Friedman stated,
The Board is very careful not to want to test the
legislature; the legislature is very careful not to want
to test the Board, and so we have this ongoing kind of
skirmishing in a good way in which each side wants
to be constantly sure the other side understands the
limits of its prerogatives.94
The drafters also discussed that the University System of
Georgia was superior to systems in other states because there was
one central authority entrusted with making policy and operational
decisions.95 Therefore, the framers of the Constitution of 1983 would
have also disagreed with altering the delicate balance of power
between these two branches of government by implementing
campus carry, especially considering the fact that firearms have
been prohibited from Georgia’s universities since 1810.96 Based on
the interpretation above of the text and the intent of the framers,
Georgia’s university system should enjoy the same constitutional
protection given by Michigan, California, and Minnesota.97 In fact,
Georgia’s university autonomy provision warrants even more
protection than the “Big Three” states due to the particularly
unique history surrounding this constitutional amendment.98

(July 17, 1980) (“I think that would be a major power. What [lump sum appropriations are]
doing is protecting them from the General Assembly.”).
93 Committee to Revise Article VIII, supra note 50, at 12.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 4–7 (describing the uniqueness of Georgia’s university system and that other
higher education leaders across the country envied it).
96 See Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Injunction and Memorandum in Support at 7, Knox v. Deal,
No. 2017CV295763, 2017 WL 4354614 (Ga. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2017) (“And be it further
ordained that no student shall be allowed to keep any gun, pistol, Dagger, Dirk sword cane
or any other offensive weapon . . . .” (citing THE MINUTES OF THE SENATUS ACADEMICUS 1799–
1842, at 85 (1976)).
97 See Hutchens, supra note 27, at 282 (reasoning that Michigan, California, and
Minnesota strongly recognize university autonomy under their Constitutions). Other states
have also recognized that universities are protected from legislative and executive
interference. Id. at 293–307. But the parameters of their powers are less clear. Id.
98 See id. at 282 (discussing the “Big Three” states: Michigan, California, and Minnesota).
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C. EFFECTS OF THE STATUTE IF HELD VALID

Deciding where firearms should or should not be allowed on
college campuses should be a power within the Board’s discretion
because firearms affect the quality of postsecondary education. The
effects of the statute demonstrate that campus carry conflicts with
the Board’s ability to effectively govern, control, and manage
educational policy. The exceptions that the legislature incorporated
into H.B. 280 do not adequately address the educational concerns
associated with permitting guns on college campuses,99
demonstrating that the General Assembly is not the correct body to
make this determination. The Board has drawn attention to the
overlooked issues with the legislation.100 The university system’s
inability to control the presence of firearms in science laboratories
produces the clearest conflict between educational policy and the
effects of campus carry.101 Firearms compromise laboratories
because these spaces often contain hazardous chemicals.102 A
potential negligent discharge could prove disastrous. Now, Georgia
universities cannot prohibit anyone from carrying a concealed
handgun into a laboratory, putting both student and faculty safety
at risk and threatening important research.103
Furthermore, professors and students have argued that
permitting firearms in classrooms jeopardizes education because
students and faculty feel less comfortable discussing sensitive
topics.104 Governor Deal described universities as “sanctuaries of
See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(c)(20)(A) (2018) (describing exceptions).
See Additional Information Regarding House Bill 280, UNIV. SYS. OF GA.,
https://www.usg.edu/hb280/additional_information (last visited Nov. 13, 2019) (discussing
that handguns are permitted in laboratories, summer camps, health centers, and spaces
where high school students are present and that faculty members cannot inform students
that they are taking a class with high school students where guns are prohibited nor carry
guns in their own offices).
101 Id. A similar argument can be made for art studios, which contain dangerous equipment
that can reach temperatures above 20,000 degrees Fahrenheit. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for an
Injunction and Memorandum in Support, supra note 96, at 41.
102 See William F. Banholzer et al., The Importance of Teaching Safety, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS (May 6, 2013), https://cen.acs.org/articles/91/i18/Importance-TeachingSafety.html (reasoning that students in academic labs are more likely to be injured than
workers in industrial ones and noting that academic lab accidents have recently resulted in
fatalities).
103 See Additional Information Regarding House Bill 280, supra note 100.
104 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Injunction and Memorandum in Support, supra note
96, at 42 (claiming that guns will have a disparate impact on academic discussions);
STUDENTS FOR GUN FREE SCHOOLS, WHY OUR CAMPUSES ARE SAFER WITHOUT CONCEALED
HANDGUNS
2,
http://dev.keepgunsoffcampus.org/wp99

100
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learning” when vetoing campus carry in 2016, 105 and the classroom
serves as the central forum for learning. Firearms have likely been
banned from Georgia’s campuses for centuries because university
officials and legislators did not view them as appropriate in the
educational environment.106 Granted, students and faculty would
not necessarily know that someone else in the classroom possessed
a firearm because Georgia law requires that handguns on campus
be concealed.107 However, preliminary research demonstrates that
states that have implemented campus carry will see an increase in
personal violence on campus and that students and faculty feel
unsafe.108 These trends support the claim that campus carry
impacts the educational environment even though students and
faculty may not know exactly who is carrying a firearm.
Also, the current statute does not allow firearms at sporting
events on campus.109 It becomes difficult to distinguish why
firearms should be banned from sporting events and not from large
events on campus with controversial speakers or even lecture hall
classes that include over 300 students. Having notable speakers on
campus to discuss controversial issues is central to education and
academic freedom. Speakers may feel less comfortable speaking on
controversial topics knowing that participants will be carrying
firearms. Texas universities, for example, have been able to address
all of the above concerns because the state’s version of campus carry
content/uploads/2013/06/SGFSWhyOurCampuses-Electronic.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2019)
(“Concealed handguns would detract from a healthy learning environment.”).
105 See Deal Issues 2016 Veto Statements, supra note 4.
106 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
107 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(c)(20)(A)(vii) (2018) (stating that exception only applies to
concealed handguns).
108 See Julie A. Gavran, Concealed Handguns on Campus a Multi-Year Crime Study, 7
VISIONS 13, 14, 18 (2017) (demonstrating that Utah and Colorado both saw an increase in
rape on campus after implementing campus carry, but causation remains unclear); Patricia
Somers et al., Duck and Cover, Little Lady: Women and Campus Carry, 33 THOUGHT &
ACTION
37,
43–48
(2017)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320087678_Duck_and_Cover_Little_Lady_Women
_and_Campus_Carry (arguing that campus carry has exacerbated power differentials
between minorities on campus and that professors have changed their teaching practices
because of it); DANIEL W. WEBSTER, FIREARMS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES: RESEARCH EVIDENCE
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3, 15–22 (Oct. 15, 2016), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centersand-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/_pdfs/GunsOnCampus.pdf
(concluding that campus carry could lead to more dangerous interpersonal disputes and
suicides on campus and that states with “right to carry” laws have seen a significant increase
in violence).
109 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(c)(20)(A)(i) (2018) (stating that exception does not apply to
athletic sporting event property).
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gives universities discretion to enact other reasonable
regulations.110 Texas universities have responded by banning guns
from high hazard laboratories and from events where the speaker
has a contract prohibiting firearms.111
D. LIMITS ON UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN OTHER STATES

Even those states that provide their university systems with a
large amount of discretion recognize that universities are not
completely free from legislative limits.112 Michigan courts have held
that the legislature can regulate universities through generally
applicable statutes enacted for a clear statewide policy or the
general welfare.113 California allows the legislature to pass laws
relating to certain budgeting issues, police powers, and matters of
statewide concern that do not interfere with internal
management.114 Minnesota has also recognized that universities are
at least subject to generally applicable laws that do not directly
interfere with daily operations.115 However, most states that
recognize constitutional university autonomy have not yet
encountered the issue of what happens when an exercise of the
police power conflicts with universities’ preferred educational
policy.

110 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031(d-1) (West 2016) (providing that presidents or chief
executive officers of higher education institutions can implement additional regulations).
111 See, e.g., THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, CAMPUS CARRY POLICIES AND
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES 4–5 (Sept. 1, 2016) (prohibiting guns from laboratories with
hazardous materials and special events that require prohibition by contract).
112 See Hutchens, supra note 27, at 285, 288, 290–91 (discussing the limits of constitutional
autonomy in the “Big Three”).
113 For example, Michigan courts have upheld laws that impose employment requirements
on universities, which all public employers must obey, but they will not uphold laws
specifically targeted at universities. See, e.g., Branum v. State, 145 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1966) (reasoning that universities are not immune from the state’s workmen’s
compensation act because it is an exercise of the police power); Regents of the Univ. of Mich.
v. State 419 N.W.2d 773, 779–80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding statute prohibiting university
from doing business in South Africa unconstitutional, and that although university could be
limited by a general public policy, such a limit did not apply).
114 See Karen Petroski, Lessons for Academic Freedom Law: The California Approach to
University Autonomy and Accountability, 32 J.C. & U.L. 149, 180–81 (2005) (discussing the
limits on constitutional autonomy). California, unlike Georgia, does not give lump sum
appropriations to universities. Id.
115 See Star Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents, 683 N.W.2d 274, 290 (Minn. 2004)
(holding that the state’s Data Practices Act and Open Meeting Law did not interfere with
university autonomy).
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Even if Georgia adopted limitations on university autonomy
similar to those in Michigan, California, and Minnesota, at least one
of the statutes comprising Georgia’s campus carry legislation should
still be considered void or inapplicable.116 Unlike some versions of
campus carry in other states,117 Georgia’s statutory scheme
specifically targets universities and is not part of a generally
applicable law or clearly established statewide policy. In fact,
Georgia’s generally applicable policy is that weapons are prohibited
from any school safety zone, which includes both K–12 schools and
universities.118 The recent legislation passed simply provides an
exception to this generally applicable rule for license holders on
university property.119
Georgia does not maintain a clearly established public policy of
allowing citizens to carry guns everywhere—and certainly not in
school zones—because the General Assembly has recognized that
there are sensitive spaces where guns should not be allowed.120 To
the contrary, dating back to the 1800s, Georgia has maintained a
statewide policy of recognizing school zones (including universities)
as sensitive spaces, and only just recently made an exception for
public universities.121
A Georgia court could conclude that the General Assembly
validly exercised its police power by permitting guns on campus but
that the Board can implement further regulations relating to
firearms if deemed properly within its powers of government,
control, and management. Georgia courts have generally held that
the General Assembly may exercise its police powers if the means
are reasonably necessary to protect the public welfare and that

See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-201 (2018) (providing for concealed carry generally
instead of specifically targeting universities).
118 See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(a)(3)(B) (2018) (defining a school safety zone as a college or
university).
119 See id. § 16-11-127.1(b)(1) (stating that it is illegal to carry in a school safety zone). For
a comparable arrangement in another state, see Regents of the University of Michigan v.
State, 419 N.W.2d 773, 779 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (reasoning that because a state act was
“directed solely at educational institutions” it cannot be considered part of a statewide policy).
120 See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 (2018) (establishing mental health facilities, polling places,
court houses, jails, prisons, nuclear power plants, and places of worship as unauthorized
locations).
121 Id. § 16-11-127.1(b)(1) (stating that it is illegal to carry in a school safety zone); see also
supra note 96.
116
117
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restricting the carrying of firearms falls within its police powers.122
Proponents of the law claim that campus carry protects students
from crimes that may occur on or near campus and deters mass
shooters.123 Even assuming that these arguments have merit,
determining whether guns should be allowed in a specific building
or event on campus should be left within the Board’s purview. The
General Assembly’s police power should not be unlimited in the
university context, especially if the legislation directly interferes
with education and is not part of a statewide policy or generally
applicable law.
It is difficult to argue that simply decriminalizing the carrying of
firearms on campus is outside the General Assembly’s police power,
but these code provisions along with O.C.G.A. § 16-11-173 severely
limit the Board’s discretion. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1 only provides
for a certain number of exceptions,124 but the Board should be able
to create additional exceptions, at least when the negative effects on
education and daily operations outweigh any benefits to the general
welfare. Research indicates that campus carry statutes have not
had any correlation with preventing mass shootings thus far and
have only led to increased violence on campus.125
If Georgia adopts the police power limitation adopted by other
states, courts may grapple with what the delicate balance between
the police power and educational policy should look like in the
future. However, given the explicit text of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-173 and
the practical implications of this code section after the other campus
carry statutes took effect, Georgia courts need not delve into a
complex constitutional construction analysis to find that Georgia’s
present campus carry statutory scheme conflicts with Georgia’s
Constitution. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-173 strips the Board of the ability to
regulate firearms in any instance whatsoever. Upholding this
portion of the statutory scheme would require the conclusion that
regulating firearms could never fall within the Board’s powers of
“government, control, and management.”126 Therefore, O.C.G.A.
122 See, e.g., King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 496 (Ga. 2000) (reasoning that the public must
require interference and that the means must be reasonably necessary to exercise the police
power (citing Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 25 (Ga. 1998))); see also Carson v. State, 247
S.E.2d 68, 73 (Ga. 1978) (holding that state law prohibiting ownership of sawed-off shotguns
was not unreasonable and did not exceed police power).
123 See, e.g., STATE OF GA. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 7.
124 See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(c)(20)(a) (2018) (outlining exceptions).
125 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
126 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1(b).
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§ 16-11-173 should be considered void or at least inapplicable to the
Board.
The states that have ruled that universities cannot regulate
firearms—Colorado, Oregon, and Utah—do not have a
constitutional provision similar to Georgia’s.127 The Colorado
Constitution does not give its Regents any powers.128 In Oregon, the
university system does not enjoy any constitutional protection.129
The Utah Constitution directly links the university system’s powers
to statute.130 Relatively few states in the United States allow the
university system the same constitutional protections as Georgia,
and those that do have not yet encountered this issue. Georgia is
actually the only state that has implemented campus carry yet also
has a strong university autonomy provision in its Constitution.131
The historical context surrounding the original constitutional
amendment of 1943 is certainly unique. Therefore, any Georgia
court should be cautious about adopting another state’s approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
Considering both the Constitution’s text and the intent of the
framers demonstrated by the constitutional commissions of
1943–1944 and 1977–1981, the Board of Regents should enjoy
constitutional autonomy free from legislative and executive
interference. However, the scope and possible limits on this power
remain unclear because Georgia courts have not yet interpreted the

127 See Regents of the Univ. of Colo. v. Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, L.L.C.,
271 P.3d 496, 502 (Colo. 2012) (holding that university policy violated the Concealed Carry
Act); Or. Firearms Educ. Found. v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 264 P.3d 160, 165 (Or. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding that the university system exceeded its authority by regulating firearms because it
was already preempted by state law); Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d 1109, 1122 (Utah
2006) (holding that the university is subject to statutes at issue and was unable to enact
policies regarding firearms).
128 COLO. CONST. art. 9, § 12 (describing how its Board of Regents is comprised, without
specifically allotting any powers).
129 OR. CONST. (excluding any mention of the university system).
130 UTAH CONST. art. 10, § 4 (“The general control and supervision of the higher education
system shall be provided for by statute.”).
131 See Guns on Campus: Overview, supra note 12 (noting that Arkansas, Colorado,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and Tennessee have
adopted campus carry); Hutchens, supra note 27, at 281–307 (listing the states that recognize
university autonomy at least to some degree). Idaho is the only other state that has adopted
campus carry and recognizes university autonomy, but the Idaho Constitution only gives its
Board of Regents the power to generally supervise and control financials. See IDAHO CONST.
art. 9, § 10. Moreover, its Board’s powers appear to be tied to statute. Id.
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relevant constitutional provision. Even those states that have a
developed higher education jurisprudence and recognize university
autonomy have not yet addressed whether regulating firearms
would be within their university system’s purview. Georgia’s
campus carry legislation completely strips the Board and the
university system overall from any ability to regulate where
firearms can be present on campus. The university system should
at the very least be allowed to regulate those situations where
education could be seriously impacted.
Therefore, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-173 should be considered
inapplicable to the Board, and the Board should be able to
implement further exceptions to campus carry. Texas’s version of
campus carry could provide some useful guidance to the General
Assembly on how to redraft campus carry legislation. Like Texas,
Georgia could prevent the Board from implementing regulations
that would result in a complete ban by implication, yet could still
allow the Board to implement additional exceptions as should be
allowed under the Constitution.132 On the other hand, the concerns
associated with allowing so many exceptions should not be
overlooked, as most universities do not have the infrastructure to
screen exempted areas or properly inform students and visitors of
complex policies. Even though statutes and case law from other
states can prove useful, Georgia courts should craft university
autonomy jurisprudence around the state’s unique history moving
forward. If the Board and the University System of Georgia are not
given the respect they deserve, Georgia citizens are left with one
lingering question—what do constitutional amendments even stand
for?

132

See sources cited supra notes 110–11 (discussing Texas’s campus carry statute).
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